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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
CURTIS JOHN MILLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990417-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
Curtis Miller appeals from convictions of burglary, a second 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 
1999) and theft, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1999). (R. 129). The court of appeals 
has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1. Should defendant's theft conviction merge into his 
burglary conviction when this court has expressly held that the 
two offenses do not merge as a matter of law? 
Standard of Review. Whether a crime is a lesser included 
offense of another is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038, 1040-41 (Utah App. 1990) (holding 
theft does not merge with burglary) . 
Issue 2. Was the burglary conviction supported by 
sufficient evidence when defendant was caught with stolen 
property, knew it was stolen and was selling it, had a motive and 
opportunity to steal it and the stolen property found in his 
possession was last seen in the victim's cabin? 
Standard of Review. To prevail on a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant has the burden of 
marshaling all the evidence that supports the verdict, and then 
showing that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the evidence is insufficient. State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 
788, 792 (Utah App. 1992)(citations omitted). 
Issue 3. Does a trial court commit plain error when it does 
not sua sponte ask voir dire questions not requested by 
defendant? 
Standard of Review. To prevail under plain error, a 
defendant must show that 1) error exists, 2) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court, and 3) the error was 
harmful, i.e, that absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the verdict would have been different. State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Issue 4. Was defendant's theft conviction supported by 
sufficient evidence? 
Standard of Review. To prevail on a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant has the burden of 
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marshaling all the evidence that supports the verdict, and then 
showing that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the evidence is insufficient. Vigil, 840 P.2d at 792. 
STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes 
or rules are included in Addendum A as: Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-
202, -404, -412 (Supp. 1999); Utah R. Crim. P. 18. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 27, 1998, Curtis Miller was arrested by Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Deputies after they recovered stolen property 
from his van. (R. 236, 241). Defendant was charged with one 
count of burglary and eleven counts of theft. (R. 1-6). After a 
preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial on the 
burglary charge and on one count of theft. (R. 10-12). 
On March 24, 1999, a jury convicted defendant of both 
charges. (R. 89, 111-13). After his conviction, defendant was 
sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of 1 to 15 years. (R. 
122-23). 
Defendant timely appealed his convictions. (R. 129). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Crimes 
On Wednesday, May 27, 1998, around 1:00 p.m., five deputies 
from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office were dispatched to a 
westside neighborhood to watch for possible criminal activity 
3 
after receiving a report from a confidential informant that 
defendant was selling stolen property. (R. H A 75, 223-24, 232) . 
Fifteen minutes after the deputies arrived, defendant and David 
Christianson left a home, boarded a white panel van and drove 
about half a block north where they met two Hispanic males in a 
Ford Escort. (R. 225-27, 258; State's Exhibit 1). Defendant 
handed some boxes to the Hispanic males from the back of his van 
and the two men placed the boxes into the trunk of the Ford. (R. 
228) . 
Before driving away, the Hispanic males removed a license 
plate from a Mercedes Benz parked on the road and placed it on 
defendant's van, which had no license plate up to that time. (R. 
229-30). After defendant drove off in the van, deputies ran a 
license plate check. (R. 236). When they found no positive 
match, deputies stopped defendant for a registration violation. 
(R. 71, 228, 235-36, 245) . 
After the stop, deputies obtained defendant's permission to 
search the van and found nine firearms, two generators and a 1996 
Honda 4-runner. (R. 72, 228, 236-38, 246, 250, 253; State's 
Exhibits 2-5). A VIN check on the 4-runner named Patsy Dorrans 
(Mrs. Dorrans), an employee of Salt Lake City metro jail, as the 
owner. (R. 239B, 257; Exhibit 6). Mrs. Dorrans had bought the 
4-runner about a year earlier and was unaware that the property 
had been stolen. (R. 239B-40, 258-59). 
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When questioned, defendant said the van was his, but 
confessed the property inside the van was stolen. (R. 252). 
Defendant offered no explanation for how he got the stolen 
property, but claimed that the Dorrans had cheated him out of 
$5,000 in a land deal. (R. 252-53). Meanwhile, other deputies 
recovered a satellite dish, a satellite dish system and a 
generator from the Hispanic males in the Ford Escort. (R. 75-76, 
228, 249). Deputies learned that defendant had sold the Hispanic 
males the property for $300. (R. 232, 250). 
Defendant and Christianson were arrested and taken to jail 
where deputies found burglary tools on Christianson. (R. 236, 
254-55). The registration to the 4-runner was found in 
defendant's pocket. (R. 240). Before it was stolen, the 4-
runner was stored along with the other property in the Dorrans' 
cabin in Echo Canyon. (R. 239B, 259-60, 269). In the ensuing 
investigation, Summit County Sheriff's Office deputies found the 
sliding doors to the cabin ajar, but no sign of forced entry. 
(R. 265-66, 275-76). However, neighbors had seen defendant 
leaving the Dorrans' property days before his arrest. (R. 270, 
272-73) . 
Defendant owned land near the Dorrans' cabin and Mrs. 
Dorrans confirmed that defendant had unsuccessfully sued them 
over a land dispute in late 1997. (R. 264-65, 271). Six months 
before the lawsuit, defendant had worked on the roof of the 
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Dorrans' trailer near the cabin. (R. 257, 270-71, 272). Because 
the tools needed for the roofing job were kept in the cabin, 
defendant either had a set of keys to the cabin, knew where the 
keys were kept or knew the code to the keyless entry. (R. 261, 
268, 271-72). After the lawsuit, defendant no longer had 
permission to be on the Dorrans' property.1 (R. 261-62, 270). 
The Dorrans had spent the 1998 Memorial Day weekend at their 
cabin. (R. 266). The stolen property was in their cabin at the 
time they left for home. (R. 267). The cabin was secured by a 
keyless entry downstairs and a lock upstairs. (R. 261). An 
extra key was kept on the porch. (R. 276). The registration to 
the 4-runner was kept in the jockey box of the vehicle. (R. 
259). The firearms found in defendant's van had been kept in a 
safe in the basement garage of the cabin together with the 4-
runner. (R. 259-60). 
Except for a couple of TV sets, a revolver and some sanders, 
police recovered most of the Dorrans' stolen property. (R. 263, 
269). The property was valued at $9,935, but Mrs. Dorrans 
estimated the replacement cost would have exceeded $10,000. (R. 
85, 263). 
lThe Dorrans initially knew defendant through a mutual 
friend, but they did not know Christianson and never gave him 
permission to be on their property. (R. 260-62). Christianson 
was also convicted of burglary in a separate trial. (R. 268-69). 
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Jury Selection 
After obtaining general background information about the 
potential jurors, the trial court asked if any of them knew 
either the prosecutor or defense counsel. (R. 178-79, 194-98) . 
The trial court then asked whether any of the potential jurors 
knew the defendant, knew any of the witnesses or had any 
immediate family members or very close friends in law 
enforcement. (R. 198-99). Next, the trial court asked if any of 
the potential jurors had been a victim of a crime, such as a 
break-in, an assault, or a robbery. (R. 205-08). The trial 
court then asked if any of the potential jurors or their 
immediate family members had ever been accused, arrested or 
prosecuted for any criminal offense. (R. 208-11). The trial 
court followed up by asking if those experiences would prevent 
them from being fair and impartial. (R. 211). 
After completing voir dire, the trial court dismissed, on 
stipulation of counsel, six potential jurors for cause: Caffery, 
Jawgiel, Phillips, Plonsker, Ross and Williams. (R. 89, 211-12). 
The State used its four peremptory challenges on Bolliger, 
Butler, Clardy and Price. (R. 89). Defendant excused Nielsen, 
Novelle, Rowley and Trussel with his peremptory challenges. (R. 
8 9). Defendant then passed the remaining jury panel for cause: 
The Court: . . . All right. Now to the 
prosecutor, do we pass for cause on the 
remaining jurors? 
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Mr. Christiansen: Yes, your Honor. 
The Court: To the defense counsel, do you 
pass for cause on the remaining jurors? 
Mr. Lish: Yes, your honor. 
(R. 216). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This court has held that theft is not a lesser included 
offense of burglary. The offenses, therefore, do not merge. 
Defendant's convictions should also be affirmed for the 
additional reason that they were supported by sufficient 
evidence. His theft of firearms alone provided an independent 
basis to convict and the State presented evidence of value and 
operability of the 4-runner. Finally, defendant failed to 
establish how his conviction should be overturned on grounds 
plain error when he failed to establish juror bias. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THEFT IS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF BURGLARY; THE TWO OFFENSES DO NOT 
MERGE 
Defendant seeks reversal of his theft conviction, arguing 
that theft is a lesser included offense of burglary that should 
have merged into the burglary conviction. (Appellant's Br. at 
14-15). Defendant relies on State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1983), State v. Pitts. 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986), and State v. 
Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983) to support his argument. 
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(Appellant's Br. at 14-15). Because he did not preserve this 
issue below, defendant asks this Court to review the issue for 
plain error. Ld. at 14. 
To prevail under a theory of plain error, a defendant must 
show that 1) error exists, 2) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court, and 3) there is a reasonable likelihood that, 
absent the error, the verdict would have been different. State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Because this Court 
expressly held, in Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038, 1040-41 (Utah 
App. 1990), that burglary and theft do not merge, defendant has 
failed to show the existence of any error, much less obvious 
error. 
In Duran, this Court applied a two-step analysis of the 
merger claim defendant now asserts on appeal. The "principal 
test", this Court declared, involves "a comparison of the 
statutory elements of each crime." Ici. at 1040 (quoting State v. 
Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)). "[W]here the two crimes are 
*such that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily 
having committed the lesser,' . . . then as a matter of law they 
stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the 
defendant cannot be convicted or punished for both." Duran, 674 
P.2d at 1040 (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 
1983)); see also State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah 
1987)(no double jeopardy where each offense requires proof of a 
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fact that the other does not)(citing Blockburaer v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)); People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30, 
525 P.2d 435, 438 (1974) (en banc) (an offense is lesser included 
when it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also 
having satisfied every essential element of the lesser offense). 
However, a theoretical comparison of the elements may not be 
sufficient to resolve all merger claims, especially where the 
crimes involve multiple variations " . . . since a greater-lesser 
relationship may exist between some variations of the crimes and 
not others/' Duran, 788 P.2d at 1040 (citing Hill, 674 P.2d at 
97 (theoretical comparison insufficient for theft and multiple 
variation crime of aggravated robbery)); and citing State v. 
Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1985) (theoretical comparison 
insufficient for aggravated burglary and multiple variation crime 
of aggravated assault)). In those situations, the appellate 
court examines the evidence "to determine whether the greater-
lesser relationship exists between the specific variations of the 
crimes actually proved at trial/' Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. 
Nevertheless, the court looks at the facts only when a 
theoretical comparison of the elements of the crimes is 
insufficient to resolve the issue. 
Applying that two-step analysis, this Court held in Duran 
that theft is not a lesser included offense of burglary and, 
therefore, does not merge. Ld. 788 P.2d at 1040-41 (citations 
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omitted). This Court reasoned that separate convictions for both 
burglary and theft were constitutional because burglary could be 
committed without necessarily committing a theft. Ld. at 1040. 
Thus, this Court resolved the merger issue on a theoretical 
comparison between the two crimes alone. Id. at 1040-41. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Duran court compared the 
statutory elements of each crime as well as the range of possible 
classifications. For example, Duran noted that burglary is 
committed when a person "enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a 
felony or theft or commit an assault on any person." Duran, 788 
P.2d at 1040; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(a)(Supp. 1999). 
In contrast, theft is committed when a person "obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with 
a purpose to deprive him thereof/' Duran, 788 P.2d at 1040; Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1999). Burglary is classified as 
either a second or third degree felony, while theft can range in 
seriousness from a class B misdemeanor to a second degree felony. 
Duran, 788 P.2d at 1040; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 1999). 
Although this Court noted some overlap between the two crimes, it 
also recognized that actual completion of the theft is not a 
necessary element of burglary.2 id. at 1040. 
2Duran further distinguished Baker and Pitts, noting that 
those cases discussed the greater-lesser offense determinations 
in the context of requested jury instructions on uncharged lesser 
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Duran controls. Defendant could properly be convicted of 
both burglary and theft as a matter of law. Thus, defendant has 
not shown any error, much less plain error. 
II. DEFENDANT'S BURGLARY CONVICTION WAS 
SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
Defendant alleges his burglary conviction was not supported 
by sufficient evidence. (Appellant's Br. at 15-17). 
Specifically, defendant claims there was no evidence that he ever 
entered or remained unlawfully in the cabin over the Memorial Day 
weekend with the intent to commit a theft. Ici. at 15. 
Defendant's chief complaint is that Mrs. Dorrans only speculated 
as to how he entered the cabin, Id. at 17, and he suggests her 
testimony was the only evidence linking him to the burglary. 
Because defendant failed to marshal all the evidence supporting 
his burglary conviction, his sufficiency challenge fails. 
To prevail on a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, an appellant has the burden of marshaling all the 
evidence that supports the verdict, and then showing that, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence 
is insufficient. State v. Vigil. 840 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah App. 
1992) (citations omitted). Appellant may not simply reargue his 
position using only selected excerpts of the evidence. Promax 
Dev. Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 1997). 
included offenses. Duran, 788 P.2d at 1041 n. 2 (citations 
omitted). 
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Appellate courts review the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences which may be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 
966, 968 n.l (Utah App. 1998). 
Direct evidence of most burglaries is rare. Burglarious 
intent "is usually inferred from circumstantial evidence: the 
manner of entry, the time of day, the character and contents of 
the building, the person's actions after entry, the totality of 
the surrounding circumstances, and the intruder's explanation/' 
State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985). In this case, 
defendant was linked to the burglary of the cabin by the manner 
of entry, the character and content of the goods that were 
stolen, the time of entry relative to when he was caught with the 
Dorrans' property, and his conduct after the burglary. 
Contrary to defendant's claims, his entry or presence in the 
cabin with the intent to commit a theft was the only reasonable 
inference supported by the evidence. The stolen property had 
been inside the cabin when the Dorrans left for home after the 
Memorial Day weekend. A few days later, deputies discovered the 
same property in defendant's van. Defendant had been selling the 
property and had the registration to the 4-runner in his pocket. 
Defendant knew the property was stolen, but offered no 
explanation how he got it. He simply tried to justify his 
actions by explaining that the Dorrans owed him $5000. The 
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Dorrans never acknowledged the debt nor gave the defendant 
permission to enter the cabin and take their things. Because the 
stolen property came from the cabin, the only reasonable 
inference as to how the property could get from their cabin to 
defendant's van is if someone burglarized the cabin. 
Defendant was the only person who had a reason for 
burglarizing the cabin. Christianson was a complete stranger to 
the Dorrans. Defendant believed the Dorrans owed him money. He 
sued them because he thought they had cheated him. He wanted to 
get even, and his belief in the existence of a debt provided him 
a motive to steal their property. Besides motive, defendant had 
the opportunity to steal their property. Defendant had been seen 
on the Dorrans' property a few days before the property was found 
in his van. Because he was present on the Dorrans' property 
without their knowledge or consent (R. 273), the jury could 
reasonably infer defendant's purpose for being there was to do 
something illegal. Those suspicions were confirmed when 
defendant was caught with the Dorrans' property. 
Defendant's possession of the Dorrans' property was not his 
first contact with them or their property. He knew the Dorrans 
and worked on their roof. The tools he needed for the job were 
in the cabin. Defendant needed a way to get into the cabin to 
get the tools and either had keys, knew where they were kept, or 
had some other means of access. Defendant's possession of keys 
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or ready access to the cabin explains why there was no forced 
entry and why he never needed to use the burglary tools found on 
Christianson. 
By having been in the Dorrans' cabin in the past, defendant 
was also familiar with its contents. He knew where the guns were 
kept and that the safe would not be locked. (R. 268). By having 
been on their property over the Memorial Day weekend, defendant 
knew when the Dorrans would be gone. Because defendant was 
driving the van with the stolen property, the jury could 
reasonably infer that he was in charge of the burglary. Finally, 
because defendant was willing to sell the stolen property and 
steal a license plate from another car, the jury further could 
infer he was knowingly involved in the criminal activity which he 
was trying to conceal. Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
Defendant claims the trial court committed plain error by 
allowing Mrs. Dorrans to speculate, on direct examination, as to 
the possible manner of entry. Defendant cannot complain, 
however, about Mrs. Dorrans' response when he did not object to 
it and then invited the same response on cross-examination. On 
cross examination, Mrs. Dorrans testified that defendant had keys 
and knew where they were. 
Q. But you also testified that you'd given 
him the combo to the keyless door lock and 
possibly the location of the keys to you[r] 
cabin? 
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A. He had the keys. He knew where the keys 
were because he did some work up there. 
(R. 267). 
Because defendant elicited the same testimony on cross-
examination that he now challenges on direct, any supposed error 
was invited. Defendant cannot obtain appellate review of an 
invited error. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989) 
cert, denied by 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990) and habeas 
corpus denied by Bullock v. Carver, 910 F. Supp. 551 (D. Utah 
1995). In any case, defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. 
Even without her testimony on the issue, the jury could infer 
that defendant was familiar with how to enter the cabin because 
he had worked for the Dorrans on their trailer in the past and he 
had access to the cabin to obtain the tools needed to do the job. 
The evidence, therefore, was sufficient to prove that 
defendant burglarized the cabin. 
III. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE 
PLAIN ERROR WHEN HE IDENTIFIED NO JURORS 
HE CLAIMS WERE BIASED, WHEN THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT LIMIT QUESTIONING AND 
GRANTED ALL OF HIS CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE 
AND WHEN HE PASSED THE JURY FOR CAUSE 
Defendant claims the trial court committed plain error in 
its voir dire of the potential jurors because the examination was 
purportedly inadequate to resolve doubts about possible juror 
bias. (Appellant's Br. at 19). Specifically, defendant claims 
the trial court should have asked additional questions when some 
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of the potential jurors disclosed, what he claims to be, a "close 
association" with the prosecuting attorney, law enforcement or 
witnesses and when potential jurors disclosed that they had been 
the victims of crimes or had family or friends who had been 
involved in the criminal justice system, id. Defendant also 
claims the trial court committed plain error by failing to ask 
other follow up questions, such as whether any of the potential 
jurors would give more credibility, weight or favor to the 
witness for the prosecution because of their alleged association. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court made no effort to 
determine whether any potential jurors had "light" or "strong and 
deep" impressions which would affect their impartiality. Id. 
Because the issue was not preserved below, defendant asks this 
court to review the issue under a plain error standard. 
Although defendant criticizes the trial court's questioning, 
he fails to identify any juror whom he believes was improperly 
impaneled. Defendant merely suggests the possibility of improper 
juror bias with a fifteen-page string cite to the trial 
transcript. Id. at 19. The string cite is misleading because it 
does not distinguish between those potential jurors who were 
actually impaneled and those who were not. A careful reading of 
the string cite combined with the list of jurors reveals only 
three people who were ever impaneled. (R. 89, 194-211). The 
remainder of the persons in the string cite were either not 
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impaneled or cannot be identified and defendant does not claim 
that any of the unidentified persons were actually impaneled. 
Without knowing whom defendant now challenges or why, the 
issue is not adequately briefed. This court has repeatedly 
refused to consider arguments not adequately briefed. State v. 
Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Price, 827 
P.2d 247, 248 Utah App. 1992); State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 
(Utah App. 1991) . In oft quoted language condemning inadequate 
briefs, this Court has said "[i]t is well settled that an 
appellate court is not *a depository in which the appealing party 
may dump the burden of argument and research."7 State v. Vigil, 
922 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah App. 1996)(citations omitted); see also 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9) (argument shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented). 
Defendant's challenge to the adequacy of voir dire by the 
trial court fails for the additional reason that this issue 
typically arises when a trial court refuses to ask additional 
questions proposed by defense counsel. See e.g. State v. 
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 866-68 (Utah 1998)(citations 
omitted). In this case, defendant never proposed any additional 
questions and the trial court never denied the request. By 
arguing plain error on appeal, defendant essentially argues that 
the trial court had an affirmative duty to divine additional 
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questions on behalf of defense counsel, especially those 
questions that may have proved more helpful after an unfavorable 
outcome at trial. Defendant cites no authority for that 
proposition and the State has found none. Therefore, no error 
exists, let alone obvious error. 
Finally, defendant cannot show prejudice because the trial 
court granted the stipulated challenges for cause, no additional 
challenges for cause were denied, and defendant passed the jury 
panel for cause. Moreover, as stated above, defendant identifies 
no juror he claims was biased. 
IV. DEFENDANT'S THEFT CONVICTION WAS 
SUPPORTED RY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
Defendant seeks reversal of his second degree felony theft 
conviction for two reasons: first, he argues the State failed to 
produce evidence of the market value of the stolen property; 
second, he argues the State failed to present evidence that the 
4-runner was operable. Both arguments are irrelevant because the 
theft of the firearms alone provided an independent basis for a 
conviction. Furthermore, the value of the property and the 
operability of the 4-runner were supported by sufficient 
evidence. 
A. Defendant'3 Burglary Conviction Was 
Supported By Sufficient Evidence 
Because He Stole Firearms 
Second degree felony theft includes the theft of property 
valued at $5,000 or more, theft of a firearm or theft of an 
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operable motor vehicle. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (a) (i) , 
(ii) (Supp. 1999) . Since defendant could be convicted of second 
degree felony theft for stealing the firearms alone regardless of 
their value, whether the total property was valued at $5,000 or 
more or whether the 4-runner was an operable motor vehicle is 
irrelevant. 
Defendant does not dispute that the firearms he possessed 
were stolen. Moreover, as explained above, the evidence was 
sufficient to prove that defendant committed the theft. The 
State, therefore, was not required to prove either the value of 
the property stolen or that the vehicle was operable. 
B. The Value Of The Stolen Property 
Was Supported By Sufficient 
Evidence 
Even if the total value of the property were relevant, there 
was sufficient evidence that its value exceeded $5,000. Defendant 
claims the State only proved the replacement cost of the stolen 
property, but not its market value. (Appellant's Br. at 23). 
Defendant also argues that Mrs. Dorrans could not testify to the 
property's value as she was not the one who prepared the values 
on the itemized list and she did not adopt them as her own. Id. 
at 23. Defendant cites State v. Logan. 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977)f 
State v. Lvman, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah App. 1998), and State v. 
Slowe, 728 P.2d HO (Utah 1986) as support. Defendant's 
arguments are without merit for the following reasons: 
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In Logan, the Utah Supreme Court declared market value to be 
the appropriate standard for determining the value of stolen 
property not otherwise provided by statute. Logan, 563 P.2d at 
813. The Utah Supreme Court has also held that an owner is 
presumed to be familiar with the value of his possessions and is 
competent to testify on the present market value of his property. 
State v. Purcell, 711 P. 243, 245 (Utah 1983). The statute on 
which Logan relied, however, required the property to be totally 
destroyed as a condition precedent to a determination of market 
value and, in the alternative, allowed value to be determined by 
replacement cost if market value cannot be determined. Ld. at 
813; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101(4)(Supp. 1999). 
In this case, the goods were not totally destroyed because 
the Dorrans recovered most of them. (R. 264). During trial, Mrs. 
Dorrans was shown a list of the goods along with the values. 
Although neither she nor her husband personally "arrived at" the 
values, Mrs. Dorrans said the numbers were very conservative and 
the goods would have cost more than $10,000 to replace, id. The 
fact that the identity of the preparer was unknown and that no 
one else testified as to the value or the condition of the 
property is irrelevant because Mrs. Dorrans was presumed to know 
the value of her property. Her testimony confirmed that the 
value of her property exceeded $5,000. Defendant presented no 
contrary evidence to rebut that presumption; nor did he show that 
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she did not know the values or that the values were somehow less 
or even different from what she testified to. 
Finally, defendant in effect acknowledged that the value of 
the goods equaled or exceeded the $5,000 statutory minimum when 
he tried to justify the theft by telling the police that the 
Dorrans owed him at least that much. Defendant, in effect, 
assumed the role of willing buyer and seller in taking what he 
apparently believed to be the equivalent value of the $5,000 debt 
he claimed they owed him. 
Therefore, the value of the stolen goods was supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
C The Vehicle Was Operable 
Likewise, sufficient evidence supported the reasonable 
inference that the 4-runner was operable. Defendant equates 
"operable" with whether the vehicle was driveable. Although a 
driveable vehicle is operable, the word "operable" encompasses 
more. Operable means "fit, possible, or desirable to use: 
practicable." MERRIAM-WEBSTERS COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
1994). 
Evidence that the vehicle was operable is supported by 
reasonable inference. First, the vehicle had been registered. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-203 et seq. (Supp. 1999)(vehicle must 
pass safety inspection to be registered). Second, the Dorrans 
bought the 4-runner only a year before the theft and the vehicle 
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was valued at approximately $5,000. If the vehicle was not 
operable, the value would have been much less. Third, if the 4 
runner was inoperable, defendant would likely have left it in t 
garage when he burglarized the cabin. 
For these reasons, there was sufficient evidence that the 
vehicle was operable. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that defendant's convictions be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
The State requests neither oral argument nor a published 
opinion in this appeal as it does not raise any novel or 
important issues. 
Respectfully submitted this f() day of July, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^ M M y ^ B u c k n e r 
Assistant Attorney General 
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(a) "Communication device" means any device mclud-
^ g a telephone cellular telephone computer or radio, 
Much may be used in an at tempt to summon police fire, 
Medical or other emergency aid 
(b) "Emergency means any situation in which 
(1) property or human health or safety is in jeop-
ardy, and 
(n) the prompt summoning of aid is essential to the 
preservation of the property or human safety or 
health 
'*> A person is guilty of damage to or interruption of a 
c o m m u n i c a t l o n device if the actor at tempts to prohibit or 
JBter^upt,
 o r prohibits or interrupts, another persons use of 
c o m i
^unicat ion equipment when the other person is attempt-
*££ ™* summon emergency aid or has communicated a desire to 
8 u m x
^on emergency aid, and in the process the actor 
(a) uses force, intimidation, or any other form of vio-
^nce , 
(b) destroys, disables or damages communication 
^ u i p m e n t or 
(c) commits any other act in an attempt to prohibit or 
**\terrupt the person s use of a communication device to 
JUmmon emergency aid 
y ' Damage to or interruption of a communication device is 
atua^ g misdemeanor 1998 
™"^Vftft Ottenses committed aga ins t frinoer, mining; 








^ to halt, impede, obstruct, or interfere with the lawful 
JjJ^^ement, cultivation, or harvesting of trees or timber, or 
ft? Management or operations of agricultural or mining 
™ u s ^ n e s 1S subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as 
provi^e(j below However, this section does not apply to action 
P ^ ^ e d by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U S C 
™k$*n 151 et s e q , or the Federal Railway Labor Act, 45 
?*? Section 151 et seq 
'*' (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indict-
ment is returned, shall cause to be subscribed upon the 
c
^mplaint in misdemeanor cases or the information or 
^d i c tmen t in felony cases notice tha t the defendant is 
sUbject to the enhanced penalties provided under this 
s
^ction The notice shall be in a clause separate from and 
^ addition to the substantive offense charged 
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court 
^ a y subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the 
^Hargmg document to include the subscription if the court 
**nds the charging documents, including any statement of 
Ph)bable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the 
^legat ion he committed the offense as described in Sub-
a c t i o n (1), or if the court finds the defendant has not 
°\herwise been substantially prejudiced by the omission (3) 
tion The penalties are enhanced as provided in this subsec-
(a) a class C misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor, 
w i t h a mandatory fine of not less than $1,000, which is in 
a (idition to any term of imprisonment the court may 
lx1ipose, 
(b) a class B misdemeanor is a Class A misdemeanor, 
w i t h a fine of not less than $2,500, which is in addition to 
^ y term of imprisonment the court may impose, 
(c) a class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony, with 
a
 fine of not less than $5,000, which is in addition to any 
^ r m of imprisonment the court may impose, 
(d) a third degree felony is a second degree felony, with 
a
 fine of not less than $7,500, which is m addition to any 
^ r m of imprisonment the court may impose, and 
(e) a second degree felony is subject to a fine of not less 
" i an $10,000, which is m addition to any term of lmpns-
0 l iment the court may impose 
^ ' This section does not create any separate offense but 
provi^ e g a n e n hanced penalty for the primary offense 1998 
PART 2 
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
7 6 - 6 ^ 0 1 Definitions. 
^°* the purposes of this part 
(1) "Building,' m addition to its ordinary meaning, 
^ieans any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleepmg car, or 
°ther structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accom-
modation of persons or for carrying on business therein 
^ l d includes 
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of 
the structure or vehicle, and 
(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected 
with the structure or vehicle 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occu-
pied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not 
^ person is actually present 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon 
Premises when the premises or any portion thereof at the 
^ m e of the entry or remaining are not open to the public 
^nd when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged 
^ enter or remain on the premises or such portion 
hereof 
(4) "Enter" means 
(a) intrusion of any par t of the body; or 
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of 
the actor 1973 
Burglary. 
'*' A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unla\VfuUy in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent
 t o c o m m i t a felony or theft or commit an assault on any 
perso^ 
(*' Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
c o m n
*i t t ed in a dwelling, m which event it is a felony of the 
secon^
 d e g r e e 1973 
Aggravated burglary* 
^ ' A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if m attempt-
m
^ ' . ^
o m m i t t m £ > o r fleeing from a burglary the actor or 
another participant in the crime 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a 
Participant in the crime, 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
w eapon against any person who is not a participant in the 
c h m e , or 
(c) possesses or at tempts to use any explosive or dan-
Serous weapon 
'** Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony 
^ As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the 
same definition as under Section 76-1-601 1989 
76-6-aQ4# Burglary of a vehic le — Charge of other 
offense. 
'*' Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with 
intent
 t 0 c o m m i t a felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a 
vehiclg 
(*' Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor 
(*' A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection 
1 ^ 1 not preclude a charge for a commission of any other 
offense 1978 
76-6-2»Q5 Manufacture or possess ion of ins trument for 
burglary or theft. 
j y person who manufactures or possesses any instrument, 
t 0
° l ' Hevice, article, or other thing adapted, designed, or 
comm o n i v u g e ( j m advancing or facilitating the commission of 
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(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact 
that the actor previously created or confirmed by 
words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another and that the actor does not now believe to 
be true, or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information 
likely to affect his judgment in the transaction, or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers prop-
erty without disclosing a hen, security interest, ad-
verse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoy-
ment of the property, whether the hen, security 
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is 
or is not a matter of official record, or 
(e) Promises performance tha t is likely to affect 
the judgment of another in the transaction, which 
performance the actor does not intend to perform or 
knows will not be performed, provided, however, that 
failure to perform the promise in issue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof 
that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the 
promise would not be performed 1973 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall 
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in pos-
session stole the property 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an 
interest in the property or service stolen if another person 
also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to 
infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of 
this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the 
property or service involved, or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right 
to obtain or exercise control over the property or 
service as he did, or 
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property 
or service honestly believing that the owner, if 
present, would have consented. 1974 
76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation. 
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single 
offense embracing the separate offenses such as those hereto-
fore known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by bailees, 
embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving 
stolen property An accusation of theft may be supported by 
evidence that it was committed in any manner specified m 
Sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410 subject to the power of 
the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a continuance or 
other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense 
would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise 1974 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unautho-
rized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof 197s 
76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation — Penalties. 
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains 
or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another, 
without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and with 
intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the property 
or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of 
possession of the property 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the 
property to its control by the actor is not presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodians consent on a 
previous occasion to the control of the property by any person 
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower 
than theft, as provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation 
which would have been 
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it 
had been theft is a third degree felony if it is wrongful 
appropnation, 
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it 
had been theft is a class A misdemeanor if it is wrongful 
appropnation, 
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it 
had been theft is a class B misdemeanor if it is wrongful 
appropriation, and 
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it 
had been theft is a class C misdemeanor if it is wrongful 
appropriation 1999 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control 
over property of another by deception and with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there 
is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, 
or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons 
in the group addressed "Puffing" means an exaggerated 
commendation of wares or worth in communications ad-
dressed to the public or to a class or group 1973 
76-6-406. Theft by extortion. 
( D A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or exercises 
control over the property of another by extortion and with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof 
(2) As used m this section, extortion occurs when a person 
threatens to 
(a) Cause physical harm in the future to the person 
threatened or to any other person or to property at any 
time, or 
(b) Subject the person threatened or any other person 
to physical confinement or restraint, or 
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime, or 
(d) Accuse any person of a crime or expose him to 
hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or 
(e) Reveal any information sought to be concealed by 
the person threatened, or 
(f) Testify or provide information or withhold testi-
mony or information with respect to another's legal claim 
or defense, or 
(g) Take action as an official against anyone or any-
thing, or withhold official action, or cause such action or 
withholding, or 
(h) Bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other 
similar collective action to obtain property which is not 
demanded or received for the benefit of the group which 
the actor purports to represent, or 
(1) Do any other act which would not in itself substan-
tially benefit him but which would harm substantially 
any other person with respect to that person's health, 
safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, repu-
tation, or personal relationships 1973 
76-6-407. Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly deliv-
ered property. 
A person commits theft when 
(1) He obtains property of another which he knows to 
have been lost or mislaid, or to have been delivered under 
a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or as to the 
nature or amount of the property, without taking reason-
able measures to return it to the owner and 
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section Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and 
costs for investigation, service calls employee time, and 
equipment use 
(2) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect 
the nght of a telecommunication service provider to bnng a 
civil action for redress for damages suffered as a result of the 
commission of any of the acts prohibited by this section 
(3) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, 
action, or remedy otherwise available to a telecommunication 
service provider 1996 
76-6-410. Theft by person having custody of property 
pursuant to repair or rental agreement. 
A person is guilty of theft if 
(1) Having custody of property pursuant to an agree-
ment between himself or another and the owner thereof 
whereby the actor or another is to perform for compensa-
tion a specific service for the owner involving the mainte-
nance, repair, or use of such property, he intentionally 
uses or operates it, without the consent of the owner, for 
his own purposes in a manner constituting a gross devia-
tion from the agreed purpose, or 
(2) Having custody of any property pursuant to a rental 
or lease agreement where it is to be returned m a specified 
manner or at a specified time, intentionally fails to comply 
with the terms of the agreement concerning return so as 
to render such failure a gross deviation from the agree-
ment 1973 
76-6-411. Repealed. 1974 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action 
for treble damages . 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the 
d) value of the property or services is or exceeds 
$5,000, 
(u) property stolen is a firearm or an operable 
motor vehicle, 
(in) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as 
defined in Section 76-1-601, at the time of the theft, or 
dv) property is stolen from the person of another, 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if 
(i) the value of the property or services is or 
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000, 
(n) the actor has been twice before convicted of 
theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent to 
commit theft, or 
(in) in a case not amounting to a second-degree 
felony, the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, 
gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, 
mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing 
animal raised for commercial purposes, 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property 
stolen is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000, or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen is less than $300 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Sec-
tion 76-6-413, or commits theft of property described in 
Subsection 76-6-412(l)(b)(in), is civilly liable for three times 
the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees 
1997 
76-6-413. Release of fur-bearing animals — Penalty — 
Finding. 
(1) In any case not amounting to a felony of the second 
degree, any person who intentionally and without permission 
of the owner releases any fur-bearing animal raised for 
commercial purposes is guilty of a felony of the third degree 
(2) The Legislature finds that the release of fur-bearing 
animals raised for commercial purposes subjects the animals 
to unnecessary suffering through deprivation of food and 
shelter and compromises their genetic integrity, thereby per-
manently depriving the owner of substantial value 1997 
PART 5 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud 
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone, he 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority 
or ut ters any such altered writing, or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the 
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentica-
tion, issuance, transference, publication or utterance pur-
ports to be the act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed 
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than 
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no 
such Tmgmal existed 
(2) As used m this section, "writing" includes printing, 
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording valuable information including forms such as 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification, 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument 
or writing issued by a government or any agency, or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other 
instrument or wntmg representing an interest in or claim 
against property, or a pecuniary interest m or claim 
against any person or enterprise 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree 1996 
76-6-502. Possession of forged writing or device for 
writing. 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly pos-
sesses any writing that is a forgery as defined in Section 
76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud knowingly possesses 
any device for making any such writing, is guilty of a felony of 
the third degree, except where the altering, making, comple-
tion, execution, issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of 
such writing would constitute a class A misdemeanor, in which 
event the possession of the writing or device for making such 
a writing shall constitute a class A misdemeanor 1974 
76-6-503. Fraudulent handl ing of recordable writ ings. 
(1) Any person who with intent to deceive or injure anyone 
falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any will, deed, mort-
gage, security instrument, or other writing for which the law 
provides public recording is guilty of fraudulent handling of 
recordable writings 
(2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings is a felony of 
the third degree 1973 
76-6-504. Tampering with records. 
(1) Any person who, having no privilege to do so, knowingly 
falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any writing, other 
than the writings enumerated in Section 76-6-503, or record, 
public or private, with intent to deceive or injure any person or 
to conceal any wrongdoing is guilty of tampering with records 
(2) Tampering with records is a class B misdemeanor 1973 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption. 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the 
payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any 
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(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the 
charge, 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may 
present its case, 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evi-
dence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits, 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appro-
priate time, the court shall instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side 
or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open 
the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution 
may close by responding to the defense argument The court 
may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for 
each party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified dunng 
trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall 
proceed using the alternate juror If no alternate has been 
selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number 
of jurors remaining Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged 
and a new trial ordered 
(0 When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury 
to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it 
may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of 
an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some 
person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer 
shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will 
suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak 
to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the 
trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay 
or at a specified time. 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are 
permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admon-
ished by the court that it is their duty not to converse among 
themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be 
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and 
that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon 
until the case is finally submitted to them. 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with 
them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers 
which have been received as evidence, except depositions, and 
each juror may also take with him any4 notes of the testimony 
or other proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any 
other person. 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall 
be kept together in some convenient place under charge of an 
officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, 
unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the 
court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow 
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, 
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and 
he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to 
any person the state of their deliberations or the verdict 
agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire 
to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they 
shall inform the officer in charge of them, who shall commu-
nicate such request to the court. The court may then direct 
that the jury be brought before the court where, in the 
presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall 
respond to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further 
instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. 
The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in 
writing without having the jury brought before the court, in 
which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be 
entered in the record 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, 
it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, 
or the jury may be sent out again 
(0) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or 
at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an 
order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count 
thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally 
sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser 
included offense 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the 
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional 
number as will allow for all peremptory challenges permitted 
After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall 
be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are 
made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause 
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall 
make a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning 
with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory 
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court 
may direct, until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or 
waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so 
many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, in 
the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons 
whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to 
conduct the exammation of the prospective jurors or may itself 
conduct the examination In the latter event, the court may 
permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examina-
tion by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself 
submit to the prospective jurors additional questions re-
quested by counsel or the defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual 
juror 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular 
court or for the trial of a particular action A challenge to the 
panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned and may be 
taken by either party 
d) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a 
material departure from the procedure prescribed with re-
spect to the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the 
panel. 
(u) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury 
is sworn and shall be m writing or recorded by the reporter It 
shall specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of 
the challenge 
(m) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse 
party, a hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon 
which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any 
other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing 
thereon. 
dv) The court shall decide the challenge If the challenge to 
the panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far 
as the trial in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, 
the court shall direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremp-
tory or for cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be 
made only before the jury is sworn to try the action, except the 
court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror 
is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented In 
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel 
and hearings thereon shall apply All challenges for cause 
shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for 
which no reason need be given In capital cases, each side is 
entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other felony cases 
each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges In misde-
meanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory 
challenges If there is more than one defendant the court may 
Rule 19 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 800 
allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and 
permit them to be exercised separately or jointly 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular 
juror and may be taken on one or more of the following 
grounds 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law, 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one 
incapable of performing the duties of a juror 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the 
person alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on 
whose complaint the prosecution was instituted, 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business fiduciary or 
other relationship between the prospective juror and any 
party, witness or person alleged to have been victimized or 
injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the pro-
spective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism A prospective juror shall not 
be disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by 
the state or a political subdivision thereof, 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant 
in a civil action, or having complained against or having been 
accused by him in a criminal prosecution, 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indict-
ment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another 
person for the particular offense charged, 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same 
charge, and whose verdict was set aside, or which was dis-
charged without a verdict after the case was submitted to it, 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against 
the defendant for the act charged as an offense, 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the 
entertaining of such conscientious opinions about the death 
penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to impose the 
death penalty following conviction regardless of the facts, 
(11) because he is or within one year preceding, has been 
engaged or interested in carrying on any business, calling or 
employment, the carrying on of which is a violation of law, 
where defendant is charged with a like offense, 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the 
defendant on the preliminary examination or before the grand 
jury, 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or 
belief as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
offense charged, or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with 
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent 
him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of the party challenging, but no person shall 
be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or 
expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public 
journals or common notonety, if it satisfactonly appears to the 
court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be 
submitted to him 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the pros-
ecution and then by the defense alternately Challenges for 
cause shall be completed before peremptory challenges are 
taken 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be 
impanelled Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are 
called, shall replace jurors who are, or become, unable or 
disqualified to perform their duties The prosecution and 
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge 
for each alternate juror to be chosen 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the 
same oath and enjoy the same pnvileges as regular jurors 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a 
privilege of the person exempted and is not a ground for 
challenge for cause 
(i) When the jurv is selected an oath shall be administered 
to the jurors in substance, that they and each of them will 
well and truly try the matter in issue between the parties and 
render a true verdict according to the evidence and the 
instructions of the court 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the 
court reasonably directs, any party may file wntten request 
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the 
request At the same time copies of such requests shall be 
furnished to the other parties The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request and it shall furnish 
counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the 
parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally, or 
otherwise waive this requirement 
(b) Upon each wntten request so presented and given, or 
refused, the court shall endorse its decision and shall initial or 
sign it If part be given and part refused, the court shall 
distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of the 
charge was given and what part was refused 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge 
or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury 
is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects 
and the ground of his objection Notwithstanding a party's 
failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions m order 
to avoid a manifest injustice 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, 
and if the court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct 
the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of 
fact 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after 
the court has instructed the jury Unless otherwise provided 
by law any limitation upon time for argument shall be within 
the discretion of the court 
Rule 20. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary 
It is sufficient that a party state his objections to the actions of 
the court and the reasons therefor If a party has no opportu-
nity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection 
hhall not thereafter prejudice him 
Rule 21. Verdict 
(a) The verdict of the jury shall be either "guilty3' ot "not 
guilty," "not guilty by reason of insanity," "guilty and mentally 
ill," or "not guilty of the cnme charged but guilty of a lesser 
included offense," or "not guilty of the cnme charged but g'uilty 
of a lesser included offense and mentally ill* provided that 
when the defense of mental illness has been asserted and the 
defendant is acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the 
time of the commission of the offense charged, the verdict shall 
be "not guilty by reason of insanity" 
(b) The verdict shall be unanimous It shall be returned by 
the jury to the judge in open court and in the presence of the 
defendant and counsel If the defendant voluntanly absents 
himself, the verdict may be received in his absence 
(c) If there are two or more defendants, the jury at any time 
dunng its deliberations may return a verdict or verdicts with 
respect to any defendant as to whom it has agreed If the jury 
cannot agree with respect to all, the defendant or defendants 
aslo whom it does not agree may be tned again 
(d) When the defendant may be convicted of more than one 
offense charged, each offense of which the defendant is con-
victed shall be stated separately in the verdict 
